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RULE 68 OFFERS OF JUDGMENT:
LESSONS FROM THE NEW MEXICO EXPERIENCE
WILLIAM P. LYNCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to make an
offer of judgment and shifts costs if the plaintiff rejects the offer and recovers less
than the offer at trial.1 Until very recently, all commentators agreed that offers of
judgment are intended to encourage settlement, and Rule 68 has been criticized
because it is rarely used and is considered to be largely ineffective in helping to
settle cases.2 Although there have been many proposals to amend Rule 68 during the
last twenty-five years, none has been implemented, and Rule 68 remains unchanged
and underutilized.
Prior to 2003, New Mexico’s offer of judgment rule, Rule 1-068 NMRA, was
virtually identical to Rule 68. In 2003 New Mexico, following the lead of a number
of other states, amended Rule 1-068 to allow plaintiffs to make such offers and to
award the plaintiff double costs if the verdict exceeds the Rule 1-068 offer. Because
New Mexico provides a broader definition of the “costs” that may be shifted,
including expert witness fees, the incentives to accept such an offer are increased.
In late 2007 and early 2008 I surveyed 200 New Mexico lawyers about their
experience with Rule 1-068 offers both before and after the 2003 amendments. The
survey sought to obtain objective empirical evidence concerning the use of Rule 1068 in New Mexico.3 Survey evidence has been admissible in court for over fortyfive years and has several potential advantages over less systematic approaches to
gathering information.4 This article will report on the findings of this survey.5

* United States Magistrate Judge, District of New Mexico. University of Illinois (J.D., 1979); University
of Nevada, Reno (M.J.S., 2001). I am grateful to the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and the New Mexico
Defense Lawyers Association for providing their membership lists to me. Ted Occhialino, Greg Roth, and Bob
Schuster contributed helpful comments on an early draft of this article. In addition to the survey results and the data
on costs, this article also relies upon my experience with New Mexico practice as a trial attorney (Atwood, Malone,
Mann & Turner, 1979–95) and as a state district court judge (Fifth Judicial District Court, State of New Mexico,
1995–2005).
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
2. There is a spirited debate about whether efforts should be made to increase settlement of cases, given
the small number of cases that go to trial and the standard-setting effect that trials have on the cases that are settled.
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.4.10 (showing that
in 2006, only 1.3 percent of civil cases in federal court terminated during or after trial); Stephen McG. Bundy, The
Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 78 (1992) (“Settling pending cases is
not an unqualified good. Often the parties and the public interest will be better served by continuing litigation.”);
Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) (Rule 68 “facilitate[s] strategic
settlement and precedent manipulation [by defendants] with noneconomic motives to deter litigation.”).
3. While most of the articles addressing Rule 68 are theoretical, a few authors have conducted empirical
studies concerning the use of Rule 68 or a state variation of Rule 68. See JOHN E. SHAPARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMENDMENTS TO RULE 68, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995); Harold S.
Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: The Practices and Opinions of Experienced Civil
Rights and Employment Discrimination Attorneys, 241 F.R.D. 332 (June 1, 2007); Albert Yoon & Tom Baker,
Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East,
59 VAND. L. REV. 155 (2006).
4. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 231–35 (2d ed. 2000).
5. A copy of the survey is attached as Appendix A.
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Part II of this article describes the use (or, more accurately, non-use) of Rule 68
in federal court, and outlines a few of the many proposals to amend it. Part II also
briefly reviews the experience with offers of judgment in state court, which reflects
the increasing rejection of Rule 68 as a model as states adopt innovative offer of
judgment rules or statutes. Since Rule 68 shifts costs, Part III attempts to quantify
the amount of costs awarded in federal court in New Mexico, and contrasts those
awards with the costs awarded in New Mexico state courts. Because New Mexico
allows a party to recover a greater variety of costs, the costs awarded in state court
in New Mexico are much higher than the costs awarded in federal court.
Part IV describes the 2003 amendments to New Mexico’s offer of judgment rule.
Part V describes the methodology of the survey. Part VI reports on the experience
of New Mexico’s lawyers with Rule 1-068 offers, concentrating on their use of the
rule after the 2003 amendments. In marked contrast to Rule 68, a very high
percentage of lawyers (76 percent of plaintiffs’ and 95 percent of defense lawyers)
have advised their clients to make Rule 1-068 offers after the amendments. While
most of the lawyers have made relatively few such offers, substantial numbers of
lawyers make significant use of the rule. Although few Rule 1-068 offers are
accepted, these offers lead to increased communication between the parties and
further settlement discussions that often lead to settlement of the case outside the
formal Rule 1-068 process. New Mexico’s lawyers are much more satisfied with
Rule 1-068 than are lawyers who use Rule 68 in federal court.
Part VII discusses five potential amendments to Rule 68: (1) changing the
terminology of the rule to offer of “settlement” and allowing the case to be
dismissed with prejudice instead of requiring the entry of a judgment; (2) allowing
plaintiffs to make Rule 68 offers; (3) increasing the sanctions available under the
rule by including expert witness fees as part of the costs that are shifted; (4) adding
a margin-of-error provision to ensure that parties are not sanctioned when they
make a serious offer but miscalculate slightly the amount the jury awards; and (5)
precluding parties from making offers of judgment for a short period of time to
allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim.
II. OFFER OF JUDGMENT RULES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURT
A. Offers of Judgment in Federal Court
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party defending against
a claim to make an offer of judgment. This rule allows a defendant to make an offer
of judgment in all cases, but precludes a plaintiff from making an offer of judgment
unless the defendant has filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff.6 If the plaintiff
accepts the offer of judgment, the offer of judgment and notice of acceptance are
filed with the court and a judgment against the defendant is entered by the clerk.7
If the plaintiff does not accept the offer and receives a judgment at trial that is less
favorable than the offer of judgment, the plaintiff is not entitled to the costs incurred
6. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3002 (2d ed. 1997).
7. FED. R. CIV P. 68(a).
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after the offer and must also pay the defendant’s costs incurred after that date.8 To
determine whether the plaintiff’s judgment is less favorable than the offer, the court
compares the defendant’s offer of judgment to the judgment actually obtained, and
the court is not required to examine the reasonableness of the defendant’s offer.9
Since prevailing plaintiffs usually receive an award of costs under Rule 54(d),
although judges retain the discretion to deny them, Rule 68 reverses the operation
of Rule 54 and makes mandatory the award of defendant’s post-offer costs, leaving
no room for the court’s discretion.10 The costs that can be recovered under Rule 68
include fees to the clerk, marshal, court reporter, witnesses, court appointed experts
and interpreters, and fees for printing, copying, and docketing.11
Unlike most procedural rules, which generate relatively little controversy and
appellate review, Rule 68 has been the subject of two decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In 1981, in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, the Court held that Rule
68 does not apply if the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, obtains judgment.12
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, commented on the anomaly that a defendant may
obtain costs under Rule 68 “against a plaintiff who prevails in part but not against
a plaintiff who loses entirely.”13 Since the defendant, Delta Air Lines, prevailed at
trial, it was not entitled to a mandatory award of costs under Rule 68, but was
subject to the court’s discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d).14
Four years later, in Marek v. Chesny, the Court held that where the underlying
statute defines “costs” to include attorney’s fees, such fees are to be included as
costs for the purposes of Rule 68.15 Thus, in those cases that award attorney’s fees
as part of costs, a plaintiff who does not recover more than the offer of judgment at
trial not only forfeits his post-offer costs and must pay the defendant’s post-offer
costs, he also forfeits the post-offer attorney’s fees that would otherwise be
recoverable by statute.16 There were vigorous dissents in both cases, and both Delta
Air Lines and Marek have been the subject of much critical commentary.17
Rule 68 was adopted in 1938 as part of the original Federal Rules of Civil

8. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 6, § 3006.
9. See Lentomyynti Oy v. Medivac, Inc., 997 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1993). It can be difficult to compare
an offer of judgment for money and a judgment that includes non-monetary elements such as equitable relief. See,
e.g., Reiter v. MTA New York City Transit Authority, 457 F.3d 224, 229–33 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing the district
court’s determination that the defendant’s offer of judgment for $20,001 was worth more than the $10,000 the
plaintiff accepted on remittitur together with an injunction that restored the plaintiff to his former position with all
of its perquisites); Thomas L. Cubbage III, Federal Rule 68 Offers of Judgment and Equitable Relief: Where
Angels Fear to Tread, 70 TEX. L. REV. 465, 478–79 (1991).
10. See, e.g., Pouillon v. Little, 326 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Although normally a district court’s
award or denial of costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Rule 68’s language is mandatory and leaves a district
court without any discretion.”).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
12. 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981).
13. Id. at 362 (Powell, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 353–54 (majority opinion).
15. 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
16. Id. at 10–11.
17. See Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Marek, 473 U.S. at 13 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 68, Fee Shifting, and the Rulemaking Process, in REFORMING THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108, 128–29 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 9–10, 19–24 (1985).
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Procedure.18 The conventional view of Rule 68 is that it was meant to encourage
settlement of cases and decrease litigation.19 Studies show that lawyers rarely use
Rule 68 and its state counterparts, and Rule 68 has been criticized for years because
it is considered to be largely ineffective in settling cases.20 According to the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee, Rule 68 is ineffective for two principal reasons: (1) an
award of post-offer costs is an insufficient sanction to motivate parties to use the
rule, and (2) only parties defending against claims may make such offers, which
precludes plaintiffs from making offers unless a claim has been made against
them.21 There have been numerous proposals since the early 1980s to amend Rule
68 to make it more effective.
In 1983 and 1984, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee published two
proposals to amend Rule 68.22 Both proposals allowed all parties to make offers of
judgment and expanded the definition of “costs” to include attorney’s fees.23 Both
proposals also allowed the case to be dismissed with prejudice without requiring
that a judgment be entered against the party who made the offer.24 The 1983
proposal gave the court discretion to refuse to award costs if the court found the
offer was made in bad faith, and the court could refuse to award expenses and
interest if the court found such an award was unjustified or excessive.25 The 1984
proposal abandoned a monetary comparison between the offer and the final
judgment and proposed to award sanctions if an offer of judgment “was
unreasonably rejected,” and granted significant discretion to the court to determine
whether to award sanctions.26 Both proposals were heavily criticized, and the

18. See Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2008). In 2007 the language of Rule 68 was
amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood. The style
amendments are not supposed to make substantive changes unless specifically noted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68
advisory committee’s note to 2007 Amendments.
19. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5, 10; Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 352; Simon, supra note 17, at 24–25. Professor
Bone has recently challenged this view of Rule 68’s purpose. After reviewing the records of the 1938 Advisory
Committee proceedings, he concluded that the original drafters did not adopt Rule 68 as a settlement promotion
tool. Instead, Rule 68 was adopted to deal with unreasonable plaintiffs who insisted on litigating a case even after
the defendant offers what the plaintiff is entitled to receive at trial. Professor Bone believes that Rule 68 has been
transformed by a pro-settlement ideology that began in the mid-1970s when critics began to search for alternatives
to the costs and delays attendant to litigation. Bone, supra note 18, at 1562.
20. See SHAPARD, supra note 3, at 8–9 (noting that a survey of 800 civil cases drawn from all the federal
district court cases that terminated in the first six months of 1993 found that Rule 68 offers were made in 24
percent of the civil rights cases that settled and 12 percent of the civil rights cases that went to trial); Lewis &
Eaton, supra note 3, at 349 (“Rule 68 offers of judgment are rarely used [in federal court] in either employment
discrimination or civil rights cases.”); Russell C. Fagg, Montana Offer of Judgment Rule: Let’s Provide Bonafide
Settlement Incentives, 60 MONT. L. REV. 39, 43 (1999) (stating that offers of judgment were made in fifty-nine of
the 4,653 civil cases filed in Yellowstone County, Montana, between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1997
(approximately 1.3 percent)); see also Leslie S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (1997); Simon, supra note 17, at 7–8 (1985).
21. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 337,
363 (1983).
22. Id. at 361–67 (1983); Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 102 F.R.D. 407, 432–37 (1984).
23. 98 F.R.D. at 361–62; 102 F.R.D. at 432–33.
24. 98 F.R.D. at 361–62; 102 F.R.D. at 432–33.
25. 98 F.R.D. at 362–63.
26. 102 F.R.D. at 433.
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Advisory Committee subsequently withdrew them.27
In 1992 Judge William Schwarzer, director of the Federal Judicial Center,
published a proposal to amend Rule 68.28 Judge Schwarzer proposed to permit all
parties to make offers of judgment and to allow the recovery of attorney’s fees as
part of costs, but his proposal limited the recovery of costs in two ways.29 First, he
proposed to limit recoverable costs to the amount of the judgment.30 For example,
if the defendant’s offer of judgment was $50,000, the plaintiff recovered only
$40,000 and the defendant incurred post-offer costs of $60,000, the defendant could
recover costs of only $40,000. Second, Judge Schwarzer also limited recoverable
costs to an amount that would make the offeror whole.31 Thus, if, after the plaintiff
rejects defendant’s offer of $50,000, the plaintiff receives a $40,000 judgment and
the defendant incurs reasonable attorney’s fees of $15,000, the defendant is entitled
to recover $5,000. This award would put the defendant in the same position as if the
offer had been accepted. Finally, this proposal gave the court discretion to reduce
costs when necessary to avoid the infliction of undue hardship on a party.32 The
Advisory Committee reviewed Judge Schwarzer’s proposal in 1994, and after
discussions about its complexity, considered whether to abrogate Rule 68 entirely,
but decided not to take any formal action until it had additional information about
the effects of Rule 68 or state variations of Rule 68.33
In 1996 the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates adopted a
policy position in support of amending Rule 68.34 The ABA proposal allowed all
parties to make offers of judgment, provided that “costs” include attorney’s fees but
not expert witness fees and costs, and capped the amount of the attorney’s fee award
at the total amount of damages awarded.35 The proposal introduced a 25 percent
margin-of-error provision to mitigate the harshness of requiring cost-shifting when
a party receives a judgment that is slightly less than a rejected offer.36 The proposal
further provided that the district court could refuse to impose sanctions under the
rule based upon “any other compelling reason” offered by the moving party.37 The
ABA proposal also contained several procedural changes to the rule: no offer of
27. See Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of Judgment and its
Lessons for Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 51, 56–58 (1997).
28. See William W. Schwarzer, Fee Shifting Offers of Judgment—An Approach to Reducing the Cost of
Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992).
29. Id. at 149.
30. Id. at 149–50.
31. Id.
32. Id. Many experienced lawyers thought that Judge Schwarzer’s proposal was too complicated to
understand and administer easily. Cooper, supra note 17, at 148 n.6.
33. Excerpts from the notes of the October 1994 meeting of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee are
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda Books/CV2008-11.pdf. from page 175 to 176.
34. See ABA Urges Offer of Judgment Changes to Counter Movement to “Loser Pays” Rule, 64 U.S.L.W.
2495 (Feb. 13, 1996); see also Bonney et al., supra note 20, at 415–18 (discussing the ABA proposal).
35. See ABA Urges Offer of Judgment Changes to Counter Movement to “Loser Pays” Rule, 64 U.S.L.W.
at 2495.
36. Id. A margin-of-error provision gives a party some leeway to guess incorrectly about the result at trial
without being subject to sanctions. Under the ABA proposal, if a defendant made an offer of judgment for $10,000,
the plaintiff would have to pay defendant’s costs if plaintiff recovered less than $7,500 at trial, while if the plaintiff
made an offer of judgment of $10,000, the defendant would pay plaintiff’s costs if plaintiff recovered more than
$12,500.
37. Id.
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judgment could be made sooner than sixty days after service of process or less than
sixty days before trial, and an offer of judgment must remain open for sixty days.38
In contrast to proposals for substantive changes to Rule 68, in 2007 Professor
Danielle Shelton proposed re-writing Rule 68 to clear up uncertainties regarding the
validity and interpretation of offers of judgment.39 According to Professor Shelton,
because the rule is ambiguous and cursory in form, it does not alert the parties to its
many nuances.40 Thus, defendants often draft offers that have unintended
consequences, and plaintiffs who receive such offers face uncertainty when
considering them. For example, because Rule 68 does not specifically address
whether offers of judgment may disclaim liability, whether they may be revoked,
and whether they must provide both injunctive and monetary relief when the case
requests both types of relief, courts must determine whether such offers are valid.41
In other cases the court must determine whether the amount of the Rule 68 offer
includes costs or attorney’s fees.42 Professor Shelton argues that amending the rule
to provide predictability and clarity about Rule 68 offers would help attorneys
intelligently advise their clients about offers of judgment and allow courts to
enforce such offers with uniformity and certainty.43
As commentators Michael Solimine and Bryan Pacheco stated a dozen years ago,
“[S]eldom has so much talk resulted in so little action. Despite (or perhaps because
of) the cacophony of voices, Federal Rule 68 remains unchanged.”44
B. Offers of Judgment in State Court
In stark contrast to the gridlock at the federal level, many states have either
revised or enacted innovative offer of judgment rules or statutes. New Jersey was
one of the first states to vary from Rule 68. Almost forty years ago, in 1971, New
Jersey adopted an offer of judgment rule that allowed any party to make an offer of
judgment and that provided for shifting attorney’s fees up to a cap of $750.45 In
1985, both Michigan and Minnesota amended their offer of judgment rules to allow
plaintiffs to make offers of judgment.46 Arizona amended its rule in 1990 to allow
all parties to make offers of judgment and also provided for an award of double
costs plus reasonable expert witness fees if a party failed to receive a judgment that
exceeded the offer.47

38. See Bonney et al., supra note 20, at 415–16.
39. See Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68: Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settlement Rule by
Injecting Certainty into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 867–69 (2007).
40. Id. at 867–68.
41. Id. at 880–88.
42. Id. at 888–911.
43. Id. at 869. Numerous other commentators have proposed changes to Rule 68. See, e.g., Bonney et al.,
supra note 20, at 427–28; Simon, supra note 17, at 53–75; Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 27, at 76–77; Jay N.
Varon, Promoting Settlements and Limiting Litigation Costs by Means of the Offer of Judgment: Some Suggestions
for Using and Revising Rule 68, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 813, 845–47 (1984). Others have proposed that Rule 68 should
be abolished. See Bone, supra note 18, at 1618 & n.194; Bruce P. Merenstein, More Proposals to Amend Rule 68:
Time to Sink the Ship Once and For All, 184 F.R.D. 145, 148 (1999).
44. Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 27, at 52.
45. N.J. CT. R. 4:58.
46. MICH. CT. R. 2.405, 1985 staff comment; MINN. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee note.
47. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 68 committee notes to amendments.
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By 1997, although twenty-eight states, plus the District of Columbia, had
provisions that were identical to or substantially similar to Rule 68, thirteen states
had provisions that departed from Rule 68 in significant ways.48 Some of the states
allowed plaintiffs to make offers of judgment to defendants, while other states
increased the potential sanctions for failing to accept an offer that was more
favorable than the actual judgment received.49
The trend away from Rule 68 has accelerated since that time. By my count,
twenty-three states now allow all parties to make offers of judgment.50 Nine of those
states shift attorney’s fees as a sanction for failing to receive a judgment that
exceeds an offer of judgment.51
Although almost half the states now allow plaintiffs to make offers of judgment,
several states have resisted the trend and have declined to enact proposals that allow
plaintiffs to do so or that shift attorney’s fees as part of the costs allowed under the
rule. In 1996 the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee proposed an offer of judgment
rule that allowed all parties to make offers of judgment and awarded the plaintiff
double costs if the plaintiff’s offer of judgment was not accepted and was less than
the judgment obtained by the plaintiff at trial.52 The proposal was opposed by the
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, a group of plaintiffs’ lawyers, and the Ohio
Supreme Court withdrew the proposal.53 In 1998 the Montana Supreme Court
proposed to amend its offer of judgment rule to allow plaintiffs to make offers and
to include attorney’s fees as part of the costs that may be shifted under the rule.54
This proposal was rejected, and Montana’s current Rule 68 is substantially similar
to Federal Rule 68.55
III. COSTS AWARDED IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURT IN
NEW MEXICO
While all commentators agree that the costs that may be shifted under Rule 68
are too small to be a significant incentive to accept an offer under the rule,56 no one
has attempted to quantify the amount of costs actually awarded in federal court. To
48. Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 27, at 63–64.
49. Id. at 64–65.
50. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 68; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 2009); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN § 13-17-202 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-192a, 52-193 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2009); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68 (2006 & Supp. 2008); HAW. R. CIV. P. 68; LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 970 (2005 & Supp. 2009); MICH. CT. R. 2.405; MINN. R. CIV. P. 68; NEV. R. CIV. P.
68; N.J. CT. R. 4:58; Rule 1-068 NMRA; N.D. R. CIV. P. 68; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1101.1 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2009); S.C. R. CIV. P. 68; S.D. Codified Laws § 15-6-68 (2005); TENN. R. CIV. P. 68; TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001–.005 (Vernon 2008) (the plaintiff may make an offer once the defendant makes the
initial declaration to implicate fee shifting, see § 42.002(c)); UTAH R. CIV. P. 68; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (West
1994 & Supp. 2008); WYO. R. CIV. P. 68.
51. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-192a, 52-193; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442; GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-68; MICH. CT. R. 2.405; NEV. R. CIV. P. 68; N.J. CT. R. 4:58; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1101.1;
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001–.005.
52. Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 27, at 66.
53. Id. at 68–69.
54. See Fagg, supra note 20, at 45–47.
55. See MONT. R. CIV. P. 68.
56. Bonney et al., supra note 20, at 392 (“In most cases, ‘costs’ are relatively insignificant compared to the
amount in controversy.”); Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 333 (stating that costs awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1920
are “modest”); Yoon & Baker, supra note 3, at 158 (noting that post-offer costs “are trivial”).

356

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

determine the amount of costs awarded, I searched the electronic database of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico for orders awarding costs
entered from January 1, 2007, through October 17, 2008.57 During that time, four
orders awarding costs were entered for cases that were resolved by jury trial.58 Two
of the cases alleged claims for violation of civil rights, and two involved product
liability claims. The trials lasted from four to seven days in length, and the costs
awarded by the district court ranged from a low of $6,079 to a high of $21,326.59
Because this was such a small sample, I examined the costs awarded during the
past eight years after other jury trials in federal court in New Mexico, and found
great consistency in the amount of costs awarded. After a medical malpractice trial
that lasted nine days, the court awarded costs of $6,539.60 Three cases involving
claims for civil rights violations had jury trials that lasted five, seven, and eleven
days, and the court awarded costs of $3,282, $4,229, and $10,798 respectively.61
The court awarded costs of $4,025 after a wrongful death trial that lasted five
days.62 And in a case involving a claim for products liability where the trial lasted
twelve days, the clerk approved the plaintiff’s costs in the amount of $17,053 and
defense costs of $9,022 before the district court reduced those amounts for
comparative fault.63
The costs that may be recovered under Rule 1-068 in state court are considerably
broader than the costs that may be recovered in federal court. In addition to the
costs that may be recovered under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, litigants in New Mexico may
recover jury fees, expert witness fees, and expenses involved in the production of
exhibits admitted into evidence.64 Expert witness fees in New Mexico are limited
by the provisions of section 38-6-4(B) NMSA 1978, which allows (1) per diem and
mileage, and (2) “a reasonable fee to compensate the witness for the time required
in preparation or investigation prior to the giving of the witness’s testimony.”65
57. I used the terms “Clerk’s Order Settling Costs” and “Order on Motion for Bill of Costs.”
58. While there were other jury trials during that time period, no costs were awarded by the court,
presumably because the parties resolved that issue without court intervention. See, e.g., Joyce v. Clarke, No. CV
06-1154 (D.N.M. verdict June 10, 2008).
59. See Order Affirming Clerk’s Order Settling Costs, Martinez v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. CV 06-236 (D.N.M.
June 17, 2008) (awarding costs of $17,802); Clerk’s Orders Settling Costs, Trujillo v. Board of Educ., No. CV 021146 & 03-1185 (D.N.M. Oct. 26, 2007) (awarding costs of $4,764 and $1,315); Clerk’s Order Settling Costs,
Rivera v. Smith’s Food and Drug Ctrs, No. CV 05-1049 (D.N.M. June 26, 2007) (awarding costs of $10,840);
Clerk’s Order Settling Costs, Moreland v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 05-323 (D.N.M. Mar. 27, 2007) (awarding costs
of $21,326).
60. See Clerk’s Order Settling Costs, Domann v. Vigil, No. CV 99-192 (D.N.M. Sept. 1, 2000) (awarding
costs of $9,726). But see Order, Domann v. Vigil, No. CV 99-192 (D.N.M. Feb. 21, 2001) (subsequently
disallowing costs of $3,186).
61. See Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Request to Tax
Costs, Martinez White v. Board of County Comm’rs, No. CV 04-565 (D.N.M. Dec. 28, 2005) (awarding costs of
$3,282); Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Appeal of Order Settling
Costs and Plaintiffs’ Appeal of Clerk’s Order of Costs, Williams v. W.D. Sports N.M., Inc., No. CV 03-1195
(D.N.M. Aug. 3, 2005) (awarding costs of $10,798); Clerk’s Order Settling Costs, Huerta v. City of Santa Fe, No.
CV 01-968 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 2003) (awarding costs of $4,229).
62. See Clerk’s Order Settling Costs, Bain v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., No. CV 03-1354 (D.N.M. Sept.
26, 2005).
63. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Mariposa Farms, L.L.C. v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. CV 03-779
(D.N.M. Oct. 7, 2005).
64. The costs recoverable by operation of Rule 1-068 are described in Rule 1-054(D) NMRA.
65. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-4(B) (1983). Some states limit the practical scope of this cost item, not only by
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During the time period covered by the survey, the statute required that the expert
testify in person or by deposition, and allowed recovery for only one liability expert
and one damage expert “unless the court finds that additional expert testimony was
reasonably necessary to the prevailing party and the expert testimony was not
cumulative.”66
There is no centralized data base to search to obtain cost bills entered in New
Mexico state courts, so I contacted plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers in New Mexico
and asked them to provide me with cost bills entered after the completion of a trial
in state court. Because New Mexico allows a party to recover a wider variety of
costs, the amount of costs awarded in New Mexico state courts is much higher than
the costs awarded in federal court. Costs of $30,000 to $60,000 and more are not
uncommon in more complicated cases, and the predominant amount of costs is often
for expert witness fees. For example, in a medical malpractice case with a five-day
jury trial, one court awarded costs of $68,174; over $40,000 of that amount was for
expert witness fees.67 In a wrongful death case where the trial lasted six days, the
court awarded costs of $66,770; $38,802 of that amount was for expert witness
fees.68 In a case involving claims for negligence and breach of contract, where the
trial lasted eight days, the court awarded two defendants costs in excess of $60,000;
the expert witness fees exceeded $29,000.69 In another malpractice case, the clerk
taxed costs of $48,012, and $17,357 of that amount was for expert witness fees.70
In other cases a party sought or the court awarded costs in excess of $30,000.71
imposing a “reasonableness” requirement on the amount of the fees but also by constraining the compensable time
to the actual time spent testifying and excluding charges for pre-trial conferences and time spent at trial waiting
to testify. See Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 168–69 (Wyo. 1989).
66. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-4(B) (1983). In Fernandez v. Espanola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2005-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 1–2,
119 P.3d 163, 164, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that it did not have
discretion to award expert witness fees as costs because the expert witnesses had not testified by deposition or at
trial. Two members of the court concurred in the opinion and suggested that district courts should be given more
flexibility to award costs for expert witnesses without requiring the expert to testify. Id. ¶¶ 14–20, 119 P.3d at
167–69 (Bosson, J., concurring). Effective May 23, 2008, Rule 1-054(D) was amended to give the district court
discretion to award expert witness fees when the expert has not testified if the court determines that “the expert
witness was reasonably necessary to the litigation.” See Rule 1-054(D) NMRA.
67. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Taxation of Costs, Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest
Pursuant to Rule 1-068 NMRA 2008, Estate of Cardon v. Ham, No. D1314-CV-07-221 (N.M. 13th Jud. Dist. Aug.
28, 2008).
68. See Notice Taxing Costs, Talbot v. Roswell Hospital Corp., No. CV-2002-132 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Nov.
6, 2003); Plaintiffs’ Cost Bill, Talbot v. Roswell Hospital Corp., No. CV-2002-132 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Oct. 15,
2003).
69. See Order and Judgment Awarding Defendant[’s] Costs, Ballas v. Tierra Concepts, Inc., No. D-101-CV2005-02477 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Mar. 31, 2008); Itemized and Verified Cost Bill, Ballas v. Tierra Concepts, Inc.,
No. D-101-CV-2005-02477 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 22, 2008).
70. See [Plaintiff’s] Cost Bill, Grassie v. Roswell Hospital Corp., No. CV-2006-00286 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist.
Sept. 27, 2007); Notice Taxing Costs, Grassie, No. CV-2006-00286 (Sept. 27, 2007). Plaintiff’s cost bill was later
denied as untimely. See Order on Plaintiff’s Cost Bill, Grassie, No. CV-2006-00286 (Nov. 30, 2007).
71. See Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 96, 73 P.3d 215, 243 (defendants’ cost bill exceeded
$43,000); Final Order on Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Sombra Cosmetics, Inc. v. Alivia Labs., Inc., No. CV-200509898 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Sept. 18, 2008) (awarding costs of $32,128, of which $24,589 were expert witness fees,
see Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs, Sombra Cosmetics, No. CV-2005-09898 (July 31, 2008)); Order Settling Cost Bill,
Speero v. Rodrigues, No. CV-2003-434 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Aug. 30, 2007) (awarding costs of $32,871 before
awarding double costs under Rule 1-068); Order Granting [Defendant’s] Bill of Costs and Cost Award, Pearson
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. D-0101-CV-2004-1665 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Aug. 21, 2007) (awarding one
defendant costs of $40,878 of which over $33,000 were expert witness fees, see [Defendant’s] Bill of Costs,
Pearson, No. D-0101-CV-2004-1665 (July 17, 2007)); Order on Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest and Plaintiffs’
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These cost awards in state court are not anomalies. I was provided with cost bills
and orders awarding costs in which parties sought or the court awarded much higher
costs. In Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy Industries LTD, a products liability case, the
defendants sought to recover costs in excess of $421,000; the expert witness fees
claimed in the cost bill exceeded $397,000.72 In a products liability case against
Ford Motor Company, the clerk taxed costs of $215,725; the expert witness fees
exceeded $196,000.73 Large cost awards have been made in other cases.74 Even in
smaller, less complicated cases where the award of costs is more modest, expert
witness fees are generally the largest element of costs.75
IV. AMENDMENTS TO NEW MEXICO’S OFFER OF JUDGMENT RULE
Prior to its amendment, New Mexico’s offer of judgment rule, Rule 1-068, was
virtually identical to Rule 68: It allowed only parties defending against claims to
make an offer of judgment, and closely tracked the language of Rule 68.76 In
September of 2002 the New Mexico Supreme Court proposed amending Rule 1068.77 The proposal suggested three major changes to the rule. First, the proposal
allowed all parties to make an offer of judgment.78 Second, because the plaintiff is
normally entitled to costs under Rule 1-054(D) if the plaintiff prevails at trial,79 the
proposal allowed the plaintiff to recover double costs if the plaintiff received more
than its offer of judgment at trial.80 Third, the proposal precluded a plaintiff from
making an offer of judgment prior to the expiration of 120 days after service of
process on the defendant to allow the defendant time to do initial discovery to

Bill of Costs, Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. D-101-CV-2005-01297 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Dec. 6, 2006) (awarding
costs of $51,172).
72. See Verified Cost Bill, Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy Indus. LTD., No. D-0101-CV-2003-00941 (N.M. 1st Jud.
Dist. Dec. 22, 2006). The district court declined to award defendants’ costs under Rule 1-054, citing the economic
disparity between the parties. See Order Denying Cost Bills, Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy Indus. LTD., No. D-0101-CV2003-00941 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Mar. 1, 2007).
73. See Defendant’s Cost Bill, Coles v. Ford Motor Co., No. D-307-CV-2005-00943 (N.M. 3d Jud. Dist.
Nov. 29, 2007); Taxation of Costs, Coles v. Ford Motor Co., No. D-307-CV-2005-00943 (N.M. 3d Jud. Dist. Dec.
14, 2007).
74. See Order on Plaintiff’s Costs, Keith v. Manorcare, Inc., No. CV 2005-8066 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Sept.
11, 2007) (awarding costs of $107,392, plus double costs of $73,517, for a total cost award of $180,909); Order
& Judgment Granting Plaintiff’s Motion and Supplemental Motion for Costs, Valley Bank of Commerce v. W.
Auto. Rentals and Sales, Inc., No. CV-2001-395 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Sept. 29, 2004) (awarding costs of $96,818).
75. See Cost Bill of Plaintiff, Munoz v. Castillo, No. CV-07-637 (N.M. 3d Jud. Dist. June 26, 2008) (for
$4,741 including expert witness fees of $2,999); Defendant’s Cost Bill, Chavez v. Gonzales, No. CV-2004-5881
(N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. July 5, 2006) (for $8,541 including expert witness fees of $5,737); Cost Bill, Strata Prod. Co.
v. McGee Drilling Corp., No. CV-96-388 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Aug. 17, 1999) (seeks $23,151 in costs, including
$15,280 and $5,497 for expert witness fees for a petroleum engineer and accountant).
76. The only difference between the rules concerned how judgment was entered when an offer of judgment
was accepted. Rule 68 provides that “the clerk shall enter judgment” once the offer of judgment and notice of
acceptance have been filed, while Rule 1-068 provided that “judgment may be entered as the court may direct.”
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 68 with Rule 1-068 NMRA. See also Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048, ¶ 42, 977 P.2d
1012, 1020.
77. See Proposed Revisions to Rule 1-068 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts, N.M.
BAR BULL., Sept. 19, 2002, at 15 [hereinafter 2002 Proposed Revisions to Rule 1-068].
78. Id. In 2002 at least sixteen states had rules that allowed plaintiffs as well as defendants to make offers
of judgment. See Rule 1-068 NMRA committee commentary to 2002 Proposed Amendment.
79. 2002 Proposed Revisions to Rule 1-068, supra note 77, at 15.
80. Id.
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evaluate the plaintiff’s claim.81 The proposal also stated explicitly what had been
the universal construction of the rule: that when a party does not obtain a judgment
more favorable than the offer, the party must not only pay the other party’s costs but
also is not entitled to recover its costs incurred after the offer.82
The proposed amendment to Rule 1-068 generated considerable comment by
New Mexico lawyers. It was enthusiastically received by the plaintiffs’ bar,
although several lawyers suggested that plaintiffs should be allowed to submit Rule
1-068 offers sooner, perhaps sixty days after the defendant filed an answer.83 The
proposal was adamantly opposed by the New Mexico Defense Lawyers Association
and many defense lawyers. They particularly objected to a plaintiff recovering
double costs under the rule, and labeled the proposal “entirely one-sided,”
“inherently unfair” and “patently inequitable.”84 They also reported three main
concerns about Rule 1-068. First, they stated that defendants often will not make
offers of judgment because they object to a formal entry of judgment, and suggested
that the rule be titled “Offer of Consent Disposition” or “Offer of Settlement” and
allow dismissal of the case without entry of a judgment.85 Second, they claimed that
defendants would not have enough time to evaluate the merits of a plaintiff’s claim
within 120 days of service of process, and suggested that plaintiffs be precluded
from making a Rule 1-068 offer for six months after the filing of a responsive
pleading to allow further time for discovery. Third, several lawyers requested that
Rule 1-068 explicitly state that “costs” do not include attorney’s fees and that
domestic relations cases be exempted from the rule.86
After considering the comments by the trial bar, the New Mexico Supreme Court
revised Rule 1-068 and again circulated it for comment. The revised Rule 1-068
continued to allow all parties to make Rule 1-068 offers and to allow the plaintiff
to recover double costs if plaintiff received more than its offer of judgment at trial,
but differed from the first proposal in four significant ways.87 First, the proposal
changed the title of the rule to “Offer of Settlement” and allowed a case to be
dismissed with prejudice instead of having a judgment entered against the party that
made the offer.88 Second, to allow defendants sufficient time to gather information
to evaluate an offer from the plaintiff, the proposal precluded a plaintiff from
making a Rule 1-068 offer prior to the expiration of 120 days after the filing of a
responsive pleading by a party.89 Third, the proposal provided that the district court
could not award the plaintiff both double costs under Rule 1-068 plus prejudgment
interest under New Mexico law.90 Fourth, the proposal explicitly stated that
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333 (1st Cir. 1986)).
83. Letters on file with author. In the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003, thirty-two letters were sent to the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure Committee commenting on the proposed revisions to Rule 1-068. The author was
the chair of the Rules Committee at that time.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Proposed Revisions to Rule 1-068 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts, N.M.
BAR BULL., Mar. 13, 2003, at 10–11 [hereinafter 2003 Proposed Revisions to Rule 1-068].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Section 56-8-4(B) of the New Mexico Statutes allows the court to award pre-judgment interest of
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attorney’s fees are excluded from the costs shifted under the rule and that the rule
did not apply to domestic relations cases.91 The Defense Lawyers Association again
vigorously protested any change to Rule 1-068, but the New Mexico Supreme Court
adopted the revised proposal, and it became effective for cases filed after August
1, 2003.92
V. SURVEY DESIGN
In late 2007 and early 2008 I sent questionnaires to 200 New Mexico attorneys
asking about their experience with Rule 1-068 offers in New Mexico state court
from 1998 to the present. Both of the main organizations representing New
Mexico’s trial lawyers—the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association (NMTLA) and
the New Mexico Defense Lawyers Association (NMDLA)—provided their
membership lists to me. After eliminating members of both associations who listed
an address outside New Mexico, 100 attorneys were randomly selected from each
membership list to participate in the survey.
To establish a baseline, the survey first sought information about how many cases
each attorney handled in the five years before August 1, 2003—when the revised
Rule 1-068 took effect—in which the attorney advised his or her client on decisions
to make, accept, or reject offers under Rule 1-068. The remainder of the survey
addressed the attorneys’ experience with Rule 1-068 offers for cases filed after
August 1, 2003. Thus, the survey compares five years of data concerning the use of
Rule 1-068 offers of judgment before the amendments with approximately four to
four-and-a-half years of data concerning the use of Rule 1-068 offers after the
amendments.
The survey sought two major categories of information for cases filed after
August 1, 2003: (1) whether the lawyer had advised his or her clients to make a
Rule 1-068 offer of settlement, and (2) whether the lawyer had received any Rule
1-068 offers of settlement from opposing counsel. The survey asked how many Rule
1-068 offers each lawyer made, in what percentage of his or her cases the lawyer
made such offers, and how many of the offers were accepted. The survey next asked
how many Rule 1-068 offers each lawyer received, how many of those offers were
accepted, and whether the lawyer made a Rule 1-068 offer in response to receiving
a Rule 1-068 offer from opposing counsel. The survey asked whether the lawyer
believed that making a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement increased the chances of
settling the case or helped the case settle earlier. The survey also sought additional
comments from counsel about their experience with how Rule 1-068 offers worked
in their practices.
One hundred and forty lawyers responded after receiving the survey, seventy
from each list. Six lawyers on the NMTLA list were defense lawyers who were

up to 10 percent from the date the complaint is served upon the defendant under certain circumstances if the
defendant fails to make a reasonable and timely offer of settlement to the plaintiff. NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(B)
(2004). A plaintiff who recovers more than her offer of judgment is entitled to either interest under Section 56-84(B) plus costs awarded under Rule 1-054(D)(2) or double costs under Rule 1-068, but not both statutory interest
and double costs. See Rule 1-068(C) NMRA.
91. 2003 Proposed Revisions to Rule 1-068, supra note 87, at 11.
92. See Rule 1-068 NMRA.
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associate members of the NMTLA, so their responses were included for analysis
with the responses from the defense lawyers on the NMDLA list. The responses
from ten plaintiffs’ lawyers and two defense lawyers were excluded from further
analysis because they indicated that they had no experience with Rule 1-068 offers
for cases filed after August 1, 2003, primarily because they practiced in federal
court or practiced domestic relations law only. Thus, fifty-four plaintiffs’ lawyers
and seventy-four defense lawyers completed the survey, for a response rate of 64
percent.93
VI. SURVEY RESULTS
A. Use of Rule 1-068 Offers of Judgment Prior to the 2003 Amendments
To determine whether the 2003 amendments increased the use of Rule 1-068
offers in New Mexico, I needed to find out to what extent New Mexico lawyers
made offers of judgment before the rule was changed. The first survey question
asked how many cases the lawyers handled from August 1, 1998, to August 1, 2003,
in which they advised their clients on decisions to make, accept, or reject offers of
judgment under Rule 1-068. The responses from the plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers
were very similar, as Table 1, below, indicates.
Table 1
Number of Cases Handled from August 1, 1998, to August 1, 2003, in Which
Attorney Advised Client to Make, Accept, or Reject Rule 1-068 Offer
Plaintiff

Defendant

None

26%

29%

Less than 25

61%

45%

Between 25 and 100

7%

21%

More than 100

6%

5%

Most commentators have concluded that offers of judgment are rarely used, yet
74 percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and 71 percent of the defense lawyers reported
they advised their clients concerning Rule 1-068 offers in the five years before the
2003 amendments.94 Since plaintiffs could not make Rule 1-068 offers in cases filed
before August 1, 2003, it is surprising that approximately the same percentage of
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers advised their clients about Rule 1-068 offers.

93. John Shapard, in analyzing the results of a Federal Judicial Center survey that sought information about
proposed amendments to Rule 68, reported a response rate of 55 percent, which he stated was “typical of the
response rate obtained in other Federal Judicial Center surveys of counsel.” SHAPARD, supra note 3, at 5.
94. All percentages were computed by excluding from consideration those attorneys who did not answer
the relevant question.
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Although the vast majority of lawyers reported either no or only modest exposure
to the rule, other lawyers reported more significant use of the rule: 7 percent of the
plaintiffs’ lawyers and 21 percent of the defense lawyers advised their clients
concerning offers of judgment in between twenty-five and one hundred cases, and
6 percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and 5 percent of the defense lawyers reported
advising their clients concerning offers of judgment in more than one hundred cases
in the five-year time period.
B. Use of Rule 1-068 Offers of Settlement After the 2003 Amendments
The next step was to find out to what extent lawyers advised their clients about
Rule 1-068 offers after the amendments. Once again, the responses from the
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers were very similar, as shown in Table 2, below.
Table 2
Number of Cases Filed After August 1, 2003,
in Which Attorney Advised Client to Make, Accept, or
Reject Rule 1-068 Offer
Plaintiff

Defendant

None

15%

13%

Less than 25

70%

63%

Between 25 and 100

11%

21%

More than 100

4%

3%

Since the 2003 amendments allowed plaintiffs for the first time to make Rule 1068 offers, I expected that the data would show a sharp increase in the use of Rule
1-068 by plaintiffs’ lawyers as they began to make Rule 1-068 offers to defendants,
and a smaller increase by defense lawyers as they advised their clients about
plaintiffs’ offers under the rule. The data did not confirm my hunch, and instead
showed a greater increase in the use of the rule by defense lawyers. The percentage
of lawyers who did not advise their clients about Rule 1-068 offers in any cases
declined: for plaintiffs’ lawyers, from 26 percent to 15 percent, a 42 percent decline
(p-value 0.0759); and for defense lawyers, from 29 percent to 13 percent, a 55
percent decline (p-value 0.0106).95 The data show slight increases in the percentages
of plaintiffs’ lawyers who advised their clients about Rule 1-068 offers, from 61
percent to 70 percent in fewer than twenty-five cases, and from 7 percent to 11

95. All tests of differences in proportions were performed using a one-tailed test. The statistical term “level
of significance” (or p-value) indicates the probability that a difference in the proportions could be observed in a
sample by chance alone. The lower the level of significance that results from the test, the greater the chance that
the difference in sample proportions is representative of the entire population. The typical choices for levels of
significance are .01, .05, and .10. GEORGE CASELLA & ROGER L. BERGER, STATISTICAL INFERENCE 361 (1990).
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percent in between twenty-five and one hundred cases, but these increases are not
statistically significant (p-values 0.1553 and 0.2534 respectively). In contrast, 29
percent more of the defense lawyers (from 45 percent to 63 percent) advised their
clients about Rule 1-068 offers in fewer than twenty-five cases (p-value 0.0166),
while 21 percent of the defense lawyers advised their clients concerning offers of
settlement in between twenty-five and one hundred cases, the same percentage as
before the 2003 amendments. Consistent with the earlier findings, very small
percentages of lawyers reported advising their clients concerning Rule 1-068 offers
in more than one hundred cases.
1. Details Concerning Rule 1-068 Offers Made
In cases filed after August 1, 2003, 76 percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and 95
percent of the defense lawyers advised their clients to make Rule 1-068 offers of
settlement. The surprisingly high percentage of lawyers that advised their clients to
make offers is tempered by the fact that most lawyers made relatively few such
offers, and they made them in a fairly small percentage of their cases, as Tables 3
and 4, below, show.
Table 3
Number of Rule 1-068 Offers Made96
Plaintiff

Defendant

None

3%

3%

One

18%

10%

3 or less

44%

36%

5 or less

65%

57%

Between 10 and 20

26%

Between 10 and 25
Over 20
Over 25

23%
6%
17%

96. The lawyers surveyed provided narrative responses to this question, and it was impossible to neatly
categorize their responses.
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Table 4
Percentage of Cases in Which Rule 1-068 Offers Were Made
Plaintiff

Defendant

5% or less

33%

26%

10% or less

48%

46%

20% or less

60%

60%

33% or less

76%

72%

From 50 to 100%97

24%

28%

Tables 3 and 4 reflect the variability of the use of Rule 1-068 offers by New
Mexico lawyers. A majority of the lawyers (68 percent of plaintiffs’ lawyers and
60 percent of defense lawyers) made five or fewer Rule 1-068 offers, or on average,
fewer than one per year. Approximately three-fourths of the lawyers made Rule 1068 offers in 33 percent or less of their cases. Yet a substantial number of lawyers
reported more significant use of the rule: 32 percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and
40 percent of the defense lawyers made more than ten Rule 1-068 offers, and
approximately 25 percent of both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers reported that they
made Rule 1-068 offers in 50 percent to 100 percent of their cases.
The data in Table 5, below, show that very few of the Rule 1-068 offers of
settlement made by counsel were accepted by opposing counsel.
Table 5
Number of Rule 1-068 Offers Accepted by Opposing Parties
Plaintiff

Defendant

None

76%

43%

One

15%

17%

From 2 to 4

6%

24%

5 or more

3%

16%

97. None of the lawyers reported that they made offers in 33 percent to 49 percent of their cases.
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2. Details Concerning Rule 1-068 Offers Received
The survey next asked how many Rule 1-068 offers each lawyer had received
from the opposing lawyer. 78 percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers reported that they
had received Rule 1-068 offers from defense counsel, but only 52 percent of the
defense lawyers received Rule 1-068 offers from plaintiff’s counsel. This shows
that, despite the amendment to allow plaintiffs to make offers, far fewer plaintiffs’
lawyers than defense lawyers made Rule 1-068 offers (p-value 0.0026).
As Table 6, below, indicates most of the lawyers did not receive many Rule 1068 offers from opposing counsel.
Table 6
Number of Rule 1-068 Offers Received
Plaintiff

Defendant

3 or less

46%

40%

5 or less

69%

73%

10 or less

89%

88%

More than 10

11%

12%

Finally, as evidenced in Table 7, below, most lawyers did not accept many of the
Rule 1-068 offers they received from opposing counsel.
Table 7
Number of Rule 1-068 Offers Accepted
Plaintiff

Defendant

None

57%

73%

One

14%

12%

From 2 to 3

17%

9%

More than 3

12%

6%

Looking solely at the number of Rule 1-068 offers accepted, one might conclude
that Rule 1-068 is a dismal failure in helping to settle cases in New Mexico state
courts. While the number of Rule 1-068 offers accepted is small, that tells only part
of the story. Many plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers wrote comments on the survey
instrument that give additional insight into how Rule 1-068 offers work in their

366

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

practice. The comment most often made (by nineteen defense lawyers and ten
plaintiffs’ lawyers) is that Rule 1-068 offers increase communication between the
parties and encourage additional settlement discussions. They reported that, even
when a Rule 1-068 offer is not accepted, it elicits both Rule 1-068 counter-offers
and non-Rule 1-068 counter-offers that often lead to settlement. Professors Harold
Lewis and Thomas Eaton, in their study of the use of Rule 68 offers of judgment in
civil rights and employment discrimination cases, suggested that defense lawyers
who do not currently counsel clients to make Rule 68 offers would do so routinely
if they received an offer of judgment from the plaintiff.98 The survey results support
this position, but take it one step further. Not only did 52 percent of defense lawyers
report that they had made a Rule 1-068 offer in response to receiving a Rule 1-068
offer from the plaintiff, the exact same percentage of plaintiffs’ lawyers, 52 percent,
reported that they had made a Rule 1-068 offer in response to receiving a Rule 1068 offer from the defendant.
Several lawyers noted a practical difficulty faced by plaintiffs’ lawyers when
deciding whether to make a Rule 1-068 offer. To put pressure on the defendant, the
plaintiff’s offer must be close to the value of the case. Yet the plaintiff may be
reluctant to disclose her “bottom line” position too early in the litigation and risk
setting a ceiling on her demands if the defendant does not accept the offer. This is
especially true if the parties plan to engage in mediation or will be ordered to
participate in a settlement conference in federal court, as most mediators/facilitators
discourage a party from increasing its settlement demand at the mediation or
settlement conference. This explains why several lawyers stated that Rule 1-068
offers are more effective if not made too early in the case, and are often made after
an unsuccessful mediation or when the parties have reached an impasse in their
settlement discussions.
Even when a Rule 1-068 offer does not lead to resolution of the case, lawyers
reported that making the offer had been helpful. Three lawyers stated that such
offers helped define or narrow the settlement range with opposing counsel. Three
other lawyers reported that making a rejected Rule 1-068 offer was helpful later in
the case, because it was factored into subsequent settlement discussions. These
comments are consistent with the findings of Professors Yoon and Baker in their
study of the use of offers of judgment in New Jersey. They reported that allowing
all parties to make offers of judgment may encourage litigants to make more
attractive offers.99 They posit that, while a bilateral offer of judgment rule may not
compel parties to reach a settlement, it may draw them closer together than they
would have been in the absence of the rule.100 Professors Lewis and Eaton suggest
that if offers of judgment are thoughtfully made, each offer might be made at a more
realistic level than the extreme initial demands and responses often seen in standard
positional bargaining, which could lead to quicker settlements.101
The survey results suggest that this dynamic may be occurring in New Mexico
because New Mexico’s plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers seem to be pleased with how
98.
99.
100.
101.

Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 364.
Yoon & Baker, supra note 3, at 189.
Id. at 189–90.
Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 364.
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Rule 1-068 works in practice. Fifty-nine percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and 69
percent of the defense lawyers surveyed believe that Rule 1-068 leads more cases
to settle or helps them to settle earlier.102 In contrast, a 1994 Federal Judicial Center
survey of the use of Rule 68 in civil rights cases found that only 31 percent of
plaintiffs’ counsel and 47 percent of defense counsel thought Rule 68 led more
cases to reach settlement.103
There were scattered additional comments about Rule 1-068. Although a few
lawyers stated that the amount of costs shifted by Rule 1-068 is too small to matter,
a majority of the lawyers who voiced an opinion on this issue thought that the rule
provides sufficient incentives to make parties seriously consider Rule 1-068 offers.
Two defense lawyers complained that the rule is not fair because only plaintiffs can
recover double costs, and another suggested that awarding double costs to
defendants would encourage more plaintiffs to accept such offers. One plaintiffs’
lawyer reported that many plaintiffs’ lawyers do not yet understand the 2003
amendments to Rule 1-068. This supposition was strengthened when a very
experienced plaintiffs’ lawyer stated that he had not made Rule 1-068 offers in the
past but was currently considering advising several of his clients to make such
offers.104 Only one plaintiffs’ lawyer complained about having to wait until 120
days after the filing of a responsive pleading by the defendant to make a Rule 1-068
offer. One defense lawyer stated that, because most cases settle before trial, the
threat of having to pay costs under Rule 1-068 is illusory. None of the lawyers
surveyed complained about the amendment from offer of judgment, with its formal
entry of judgment, to offer of settlement, which allows a case to be dismissed with
prejudice.
VII. POTENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE 68
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is once again considering whether to
attempt any revisions to Rule 68.105 New Mexico’s experience with amending Rule
1-068, together with the empirical studies and the experience of other states in
amending their offer of judgment rules, provide valuable insight on potential
amendments to Rule 68.
A. Dismissal with Prejudice
Rule 68 should be changed to an “offer of settlement” or “offer of consent
102. Twenty-seven percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and 21 percent of the defense lawyers do not think Rule
1-068 leads more cases to settle or helps them to settle earlier, while 14 percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers and 10
percent of the defense lawyers were not sure.
103. The survey randomly sampled 800 civil cases that had been closed in federal court in the first six months
of 1993. In this question, the survey asked counsel in civil rights cases how Rule 68 influenced settlement in cases
similar to the case selected for the survey. The statistics were worse when reviewing only the cases identified for
the survey. In those cases, Rule 68 had no influence in 61 percent of the cases that settled and in 85 percent of the
cases that proceeded to trial. SHAPARD, supra note 3, at 3, 8–9.
104. There is anecdotal evidence that lawyers who understand offer of judgment rules make more offers
under such rules. See Revitalizing FRCP 68: Can Offers of Judgment Provide Adequate Incentives for Fair, Early
Settlement of Fee-Recovery Cases? Session Three: “Changes to Rule 68,” 57 MERCER L. REV. 791, 801 (2006).
105. Revising Rule 68 was a topic on the Committee’s agenda for its meeting in November of 2008. See
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, November 2008 Agenda, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda
Books/CV2008-11.pdf.
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disposition” rule and allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice instead of
having a judgment entered against the defendant. Defendants may object to the
entry of judgment for a number of reasons: because of adverse publicity or concerns
that it might encourage copycat litigation, invoke collateral estoppel with cases that
share a common factual basis, or impair credit worthiness or career advancement
for individual defendants.106 Both of the proposals by the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee in 1983 and 1984 allowed the case to be dismissed with prejudice
without requiring the entry of a judgment.107 Lewis and Eaton noted “almost
universal support” among the lawyers they surveyed for changing the rule’s
terminology to an offer of “settlement” or “agreement.”108 None of the New Mexico
lawyers surveyed complained about this amendment to Rule 1-068, and it has the
potential to increase the number of offers made by defendants.
B. Offers by Plaintiffs
Rule 68 should allow plaintiffs to make offers of judgment.109 Allowing plaintiffs
to make offers of judgment is not particularly novel or controversial; twenty-three
states already do so.110 A 1994 Federal Judicial Center survey about the use of Rule
68 reported that nearly 75 percent of the attorneys favored amending Rule 68 to
permit offers by all parties and to allow the recovery of something more than the
costs allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.111 Lewis and Eaton found that plaintiffs’
lawyers overwhelmingly supported this change, and that while many defense
lawyers strongly opposed it, a significant number of defense lawyers supported such
a change.112 New Mexico’s experience demonstrates that allowing plaintiffs to make
Rule 68 offers will increase the number of offers made under the rule and will
trigger both Rule 68 counter-offers and regular settlement offers that will lead to
settlement or will help define or narrow the settlement range for the case.
C. Increase in Available Sanctions
Rule 68 should be amended to increase the sanctions available under the rule.
Some states allow a plaintiff who receives more than her offer of judgment at trial
to recover the normal costs that the plaintiff would recover under Rule 54(D).113
Since prevailing plaintiffs usually receive an award of costs under Rule
54(D)—although judges retain the discretion to deny them—this provides little
additional incentive for plaintiffs to make offers of judgment. All commentators

106. Teresa Rider Built, Practical Use and Risky Consequences of Rule 68 Offers of Judgment, LITIG.,
Spring 2007, at 26, 27; Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 350.
107. See supra text accompanying note 24.
108. Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 356.
109. Rule 1-068 explicitly states that attorney’s fees are excluded from the costs shifted under the rule. I agree
with Lewis’s and Eaton’s recommendation to have a separately numbered subdivision of Rule 68 for cases that
arise under federal fee-shifting statutes. Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, The Contours of a New FRCP,
Rule 68.1: A Proposed Two-Way Offer of Settlement Provision for Federal Fee-Shifting Cases, 252 F.R.D. 551
(2008).
110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
111. SHAPARD, supra note 3, at 2.
112. Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 361–62.
113. See, e.g., Haw. R. Civ. P. 68; N.D. R. Civ. P. 68.
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agree that the costs that may be shifted under Rule 68 are too small to be a
significant incentive to make or accept an offer under the rule, and the costs that
have been awarded in federal court in New Mexico from 2000 to 2008 support this
proposition.114
Nine states have chosen to increase the sanctions available under the rule by
shifting attorney’s fees.115 In 1994 New Jersey amended its offer of judgment rule
to allow the imposition of uncapped attorney’s fees as a cost-shifting sanction.116
Yoon and Baker found that, after the rule was amended, suits in New Jersey were
resolved more quickly (by an average of 2.3 months, or roughly 7 percent), which
translated into a decrease in attorney’s fees for the defendants’ insurer of
approximately 20 percent.117 They concluded that offer of judgment rules that allow
for substantial cost-shifting would increase the efficacy of the rules.118
While increasing the sanctions available under Rule 68 should increase its use,
the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, and states that are considering amending
their offer of judgment rules, should decline to shift attorney’s fees under the rule.
Shifting attorney’s fees is too draconian a penalty for failing to accept an offer of
judgment because attorney’s fees often account for the vast majority of litigation
expenses.119 A proposal to shift attorney’s fees under Rule 68 is likely to generate
intense controversy and doom any proposed amendment, as it did with the proposals
by the Advisory Committee in 1983 and 1984.120 Further, many commentators are
concerned that shifting attorney’s fees is too much a matter of substantive right to
be accomplished through amending a rule of civil procedure and would violate the
Rules Enabling Act.121
Even if those concerns can be addressed, states that have adopted attorney’s fee
shifting under their offer of judgment rules have ignored the experience in Alaska
with partial attorney’s fee shifting in civil litigation. Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa
Carns studied Alaska Civil Rule 82, which allows partial attorney’s fee shifting, and
concluded that shifting attorney’s fees seldom played a significant role in civil
litigation in Alaska.122 They found that attorney’s fees were awarded in only a small
percentage of cases, and that parties paid the fee award less than half the time.123

114. See supra text accompanying notes 56–63.
115. See supra text accompanying note 51.
116. Yoon & Baker, supra note 3, at 163–64.
117. Id. at 185–86. The data Yoon and Baker reviewed did not report whether either party made an offer of
judgment, whether such offers were accepted or rejected, and whether the offeree who rejected the offer did worse
at trial. Id. at 169.
118. Id. at 191–93.
119. See, e.g., Ellison v. Plumbers and Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070, 1078 (Alaska 2005)
(ordering the unsuccessful plaintiff in a sexual harassment case to pay her former union and union stewards
attorney’s fees of $227,000 and $142,000 respectively); SHAPARD, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that attorney’s fees
account for approximately 80 percent of litigation expenses).
120. As Professor Cooper observed, shifting attorney’s fees under Rule 68 is a “lightning rod for
controversy.” Cooper, supra note 17, at 110.
121. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edward H. Cooper,
Symposium Reflections: A Rulemaking Perspective, 57 MERCER L. REV. 839, 845–47 (2006); Merenstein, supra
note 43, at 155–57.
122. See Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorneys Fee Shifting in Civil Cases,
13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 77 (1996).
123. Id. at 78.
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They found that the rule did not affect decisions to file a claim, and did not often
affect litigation or settlement strategies.124 In those cases where fee shifting did have
an effect, Rule 82 discouraged (1) some parties of moderate means from filing cases
that either wealthy or poor plaintiffs would file, (2) some claims of questionable
merit, and (3) early settlement of strong claims because the fee award increased the
likelihood of a greater recovery.125 They cautioned against adopting fee shifting in
hopes of decreasing litigation, speeding up the disposition of cases, or inducing
settlement, because the impact of Rule 82 in those areas has been “complex, subtle
and often contradictory.”126 They also found that Rule 82 did not significantly deter
frivolous litigation, and that two-way fee shifting in theory becomes a one-way shift
in practice because defendants are unable to collect fees from unsuccessful
plaintiffs.127
The sanctions available under Rule 68 must be significant enough to influence
pre-trial negotiations. The experience with New Mexico’s Rule 1-068 suggests that
there is a middle way between the current Rule 68, which does not shift significant
costs, and those states that shift attorney’s fees, which can be a crushing burden.
Because New Mexico allows for the recovery of a broader variety of costs,
including expert witness fees, the cost awards in New Mexico state court are much
higher than the costs awarded in federal court.128 Amending 28 U.S.C. § 1920 to
include expert witness fees would create greater incentives under Rule 68.129
Under Rule 1-068, New Mexico awards double costs to plaintiffs who receive
more than their offer of settlement at trial.130 Since this change was fiercely opposed
by New Mexico’s defense lawyers, it is surprising that only three defense lawyers
mentioned this issue when responding to the survey. While allowing double costs
to plaintiffs, and only single costs to defendants, may seem asymmetrical, it is not
because two negative consequences occur when a plaintiff receives a judgment that
is less than the defendant’s offer of judgment; the plaintiff must pay the defendant’s
costs incurred after the date of the offer, and she is also denied her costs incurred
after the offer, even though, as the prevailing party, she would normally recover
such costs.131 Judge Posner, a leading scholar of law and economics, believes that
awarding double costs to the plaintiff is equivalent to the sanction imposed on a
plaintiff who rejects an offer of judgment from the defendant and then recovers less
at trial.132 Rule 68 should be amended to allow double costs to plaintiffs when they
124. Id.
125. Id. at 79–84.
126. Id. at 87.
127. Id. at 88–89.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 64–66. Other states that allow the recovery of expert witness fees
include Arizona, California, and Colorado. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 68(g); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998(c)(1) (West
2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-202(1)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
129. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 17, at 131.
130. See Order on Plaintiff’s Costs, Keith v. Manorcare, Inc., No. CV 2005-8066 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Sept.
11, 2007) (awarding pre-offer costs of $107,392 and double the post-offer costs of $36,758, for a total cost award
in excess of $180,000); Order Settling Cost Bill, Speero v. Rodrigues, No. CV-2003-434 (N.M. 5th Jud. Dist. Aug.
30, 2007) (awarding pre-offer costs of $13,296 and double the post-offer costs of $19,575 for a total cost recovery
in excess of $52,000). Minnesota has recently amended its offer of judgment rule to award double costs to plaintiffs
when they receive more than their offer of judgment at trial. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 68.03 (effective July 1, 2008).
131. See Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 331–33 (1st Cir. 1986).
132. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 1995).
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receive more than their offer of judgment at trial.
D. Margin of Error
If more severe sanctions are to be imposed for failure to accept an offer of
judgment, Rule 68 should be amended to add a margin-of-error provision. As
currently drafted, Rule 68 imposes sanctions whenever the “judgment finally
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer.”133 Some cases present
difficult issues of liability, while others present genuine uncertainty as to damages,
and jury unpredictability is an ever-present danger even for experienced trial
lawyers.134 Rule 68 should not impose sanctions because a party cannot predict to
the penny what the jury might award.135 For example, in Bright v. Land O’Lakes,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of costs under Rule 68 even though it
concluded that the offer of judgment came “surprisingly close” to the actual damage
award.136 The proposal by the ABA House of Delegates in 1996 included a 25
percent margin-of-error provision to mitigate the harshness of requiring costshifting when a party receives a judgment that is slightly less than a rejected Rule
68 offer.137 Several states have 25 percent margin-of-error provisions, while New
Jersey has a 20 percent provision and Alaska has a 5 percent margin-of-error
provision.138 Including a margin-of-error provision of 10 percent to 20 percent
would ensure that parties are not sanctioned when they made a serious offer but
miscalculated slightly what the jury would award.
E. Timing of Offer
If plaintiffs are allowed to make Rule 68 offers, they should be precluded from
doing so for a period of time to allow the defendant a fair opportunity to evaluate
the merits of the case.139 Otherwise, the plaintiff could make a Rule 68 offer when
suit was filed.140 How long it takes to evaluate a case depends upon its complexity
and whether the parties have informally exchanged information before suit is filed.

133. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).
134. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1347 (1994) (noting that there can be enormous variability in trial results
“because lawyers, judges, and juries may produce very different results in the same case”).
135. Many years ago, when I was a young attorney struggling to value a case, one of my senior partners told
me: “Anyone can tell the difference between cases that are worth $15,000 and $150,000, but no one can tell what
will make one jury award $10,000 and another $15,000 in similar cases.”
136. The defendants made an offer of judgment for $225,000, and the plaintiff won “either $250,000 or
$226,608.91, which is the $250,000 amount less the $23,391.09 counterclaim won” by one of the defendants.
Bright v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 844 F.2d 436, 443 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Gilmore v. Duderstadt, 1998-NMCA086, ¶ 36, 961 P.2d 175, 185 (costs were awarded under Rule 1-068 even though the defendants’ offer of judgment
for $75,000 was quite close to the final judgment, which included an award of prejudgment interest, of
$76,747.31).
137. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
138. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(b) (5 percent); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68(b) (2008) (25 percent); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 970(c) (25 percent); N.J. CT. R. 4:58-2(a) (20 percent).
139. Likewise, defendants who file counterclaims should be precluded from making an offer of judgment
for a period of time after the counterclaim has been filed to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to evaluate the merits
of the counterclaim.
140. Rule 68(a) provides that an offer of judgment may be made any time more “than 10 days before the trial
begins.”
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In many cases some discovery may be necessary before the parties can estimate the
likely outcome of the case. An experienced defense attorney may be able to evaluate
simple cases—such as tort litigation arising out of an automobile accident—fairly
quickly, but more complicated cases will take more time to evaluate. Lewis and
Eaton reported that the lawyers they surveyed overwhelmingly agreed that a defense
lawyer can value a civil rights or employment discrimination case within four to six
months after the case is filed.141
New Mexico precludes a plaintiff from making a Rule 1-068 offer prior to the
expiration of 120 days after the filing of a responsive pleading by a party. Only one
plaintiff’s lawyer complained that he could not make an offer before that time, and
none of the defense lawyers claimed that they did not have enough time to evaluate
a Rule 1-068 offer.142 Given Lewis’s and Eaton’s finding and the responses from
New Mexico’s lawyers, precluding plaintiffs’ offers until 120 days after a
responsive pleading has been filed appears to allow a reasonable time period for
defendants to evaluate offers under Rule 68.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Although Rule 68 has been in existence for many years, a consensus has
developed over the last thirty years that it is in serious need of reform. This
consensus is reflected in the literature and in the trend by the states to vary from the
Rule 68 pattern and adopt innovative offer of judgment rules. The recent empirical
studies by Harold Lewis, Thomas Eaton, Albert Yoon, and Tom Baker, together
with the earlier work done by John Shapard, demonstrate that Rule 68 could be
enhanced by allowing all parties to make offers of judgment and by increasing the
sanctions available under the rule.
New Mexico’s experience with its amended Rule 1-068 suggests that including
expert witness fees as part of the costs that can be shifted will increase the
incentives to make offers of judgment, but not to the level of attorney’s fee shifting,
which is too draconian a penalty. If Rule 68 is to be amended, the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee should also consider (1) changing the terminology of the rule
to “offer of settlement” and allow the case to be dismissed without entry of a
judgment, (2) adding a margin-of-error provision, and (3) prohibiting the parties
from making offers of judgment for a period of time to allow the opposing party a
fair opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim. New Mexico’s experience with
its amendments demonstrates that they increase the use of Rule 1-068 offers and
that, even though such offers are not often accepted, they lead to further settlement
discussions that often lead to settlement of the case outside the formal Rule 1-068
process. Adopting these amendments will have the potential to transform Rule 68
from a one-way rule with limited incentives into a rule with more significant
incentives that may assist all parties to resolve litigation more quickly.

141. Lewis & Eaton, supra note 3, at 353.
142. Rule 1-068 supplements but does not supplant the traditional settlement process. Plaintiffs in New
Mexico remain free to make settlement offers immediately after the case has been filed; they simply are precluded
from making a Rule 1-068 offer, with its increased sanctions, for the specified period of time.

APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING RULE 1-068
1. Approximately how many cases did you handle in the five years before August
1, 2003, in which you advised your client on decisions to make, accept, or reject
offers under Rule 1-068?
_____ a. none
_____ b. less than 25
_____ c. between 25 and 100
_____ d. more than 100
2. Approximately how many cases filed after August 1, 2003, have you handled in
which you advised your client on decisions to make, accept, or reject offers under
Rule 1-068?
_____ a. none
_____ b. less than 25
_____ c. between 25 and 100
_____ d. more than 100
3. Whom do you primarily represent?
_____ a. plaintiffs
_____ b. defendants
If you primarily represent plaintiffs, please answer question 4.
If you primarily represent defendants, please answer question 5.
If you wish to make additional comments about Rule 1-068, please make them here
or on the back of this page.
4(A). If you primarily represent plaintiffs, have you advised your client (plaintiff)
to make a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement in cases filed after August 1, 2003?
_____ a. yes
_____ b. no
If you answered yes to this question:
1. How many Rule 1-068 offers of settlement have you made?
2. In what percentage of your cases did you make such offers?
3. How many of your offers of settlement were accepted?
4. In general, do you believe that making a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement increases the chances of settling the case, or helps the case settle
earlier? Please explain.
4(B). Since August 1, 2003, have you received offers of settlement from defendants
under Rule 1-068?
_____ a. yes
_____ b. no
If you answered yes:
1. How many Rule 1-068 offers of settlement did you receive?
2. How many Rule 1-068 offers of settlement did you accept?
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3. Did you make a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement in response to
receiving a Rule 1-068 offer from defendant?
5(A). If you primarily represent defendants, have you advised your client
(defendant) to make a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement in cases filed after August 1,
2003?
_____ a. yes
_____ b. no
If you answered yes to this question:
1. How many Rule 1-068 offers of settlement have you made?
2. In what percentage of your cases did you make such offers?
3. How many of your offers of settlement were accepted?
4. In general, do you believe that making a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement increases the chances of settling the case, or helps the case settle
earlier? Please explain.
5(B). Since August 1, 2003, have you received offers of settlement from plaintiffs
under Rule 1-068?
_____ a. yes
_____ b. no
If you answered yes:
1. How many Rule 1-068 offers of settlement did you receive?
2. How many Rule 1-068 offers of settlement did you accept?
3. Did you make a Rule 1-068 offer of settlement in response to
receiving a Rule 1-068 offer from plaintiff?

